Israel’s Opposition Has The Numbers To Oust Netanyahu: What Happens Next?
(ANALYSIS) According to exit polls, Israel’s opposition appears to have achieved something remarkable: A parliamentary majority of perhaps 66 out of the 120 seats, including their 47 seats and the Arab parties’ 19 seats at current count.
In almost any other parliamentary democracy, such a result would be understood as a decisive victory for the forces seeking a change of government. Yet Israel may be heading toward the extraordinary spectacle of an opposition that wins a commanding majority and nevertheless allows the incumbent, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies, to remain in power.
The reason is a political taboo: Several opposition leaders have promised not to form a government dependent on the support of Arab parties, even though virtually every plausible path to replacing Netanyahu requires precisely that. If the exit polls and partial counts are right, those Arab parties have almost doubled their Knesset representation. This happened because of a huge increase in voter turnout among the 20% of Israelis who are Arabs.
In past elections, almost half the Arabs stayed home on Election Day, compared to participation levels of around 80% among Jews. The surge appears to have been driven by despair over the perceived hostility of the Netanyahu government, and anger over ultranationalist minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has displayed inaction and indifference about the lawlessness that bedevils the Arab sector.
The two Arab parties — Ra’am and the United Arab List — have already offered to back Gadi Eisenkot, the former military chief who heads the largest opposition party, Yashar.
This landscape presents the wider opposition with a real dilemma. Its leaders may end up breaking their most important promise to voters — to remove Netanyahu from office — in order to honor a secondary promise not to form a governing coalition with Arab parties and depend on the safety net they offer. That promise should have been no more than a white lie to reassure wavering Jewish voters who in the past supported the right. Sticking to it would be a spectacular case of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
The opposition should bite the bullet, accept Arab parliamentary support, remove Netanyahu from office and get on with governing. It could focus initially on repairing democratic institutions, restoring public trust and addressing the country’s many neglected problems, while avoiding major initiatives on the Palestinian question, where such an arrangement would be particularly fragile. There would be outrage from the right, accusations of illegitimacy and endless political shouting. The opposition should let the critics shout. But whether its leaders will have the courage to take this course is another matter.
Scenarios for forming a government
Several other scenarios are possible, none especially appealing. One is a national unity government with Netanyahu but without his far-right partners.
Another is a unity government in which Netanyahu relinquishes the premiership, perhaps becoming foreign minister — although that would require changing the law, since his ongoing criminal trial currently prevents him from serving as an ordinary minister even as he can remain prime minister.
A third possibility is another election, prolonging the paralysis. And a fourth is a defection from the opposition, perhaps by Avigdor Lieberman, that gives Netanyahu enough seats to assemble a narrow governing majority.
In other words, even a clear electoral defeat may not be enough to dislodge him. That is doubly true because President Donald Trump, who endorsed Netanyahu and is taking credit for Bibi’s performance, seems likely to pressure Eisenkot to agree to some form of unity.
The machinations might include restarting the war with Iran. They might include some fancy peace plan and a Netanyahu shift to the center. Eisenkot should probably resist it all, because both Netanyahu and Trump cannot be trusted as far as you can throw them. Will he? That’s another question.
In his speech to supporters after polls closed Tuesday, Eisenkot promised to use the results to set up a government. “The Israeli public voted to end Netanyahu’s rule as the prime minister of Israel,” he said. “It’s my personal duty to do everything to bring about the will of the people.”
As a high school teacher of mine used to say: We shall see, said the blind man.
None of the options are clean and simple. But the notion that Arab parliamentary support renders a government illegitimate is neither a democratic principle nor a reflection of Israel’s political history.
Israel has governed with Arab support before
A look at history reveals something that Netanyahu’s long dominance has helped obscure. Since the political upheaval of 1977, Likud victories have generally depended on ultra-Orthodox support, while victories by the non-Likud camp have repeatedly depended on Arab votes.
In 1984, Shimon Peres managed to force a parliamentary tie with the help of six seats held by Arab parties. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin’s victory yielded a majority of 61 seats only when five Arab lawmakers were counted. In 1999, Ehud Barak won a landslide in the direct election for prime minister, but his reliable parliamentary bloc numbered only 60 seats, including 10 Arab lawmakers. The addition of right wing parties enabled him to govern.
The pattern continued in 2006, when Kadima’s victory was widely perceived as decisive, even though its assured parliamentary bloc numbered just 60 seats without additional Arab support. And in 2021, Yair Lapid’s success in assembling a government that ended Netanyahu’s 12 consecutive years in power depended on a parliamentary alignment of 61 lawmakers opposed to Netanyahu, including 10 Arab representatives.
With the notable exception of Ra’am in 2021, Arab parties generally did not become formal coalition partners. Peres formed a national unity government with Likud – and Rabin, his majority secured via the Arab parties, formally brought in the religious party Shas. In all these cases the Arabs’ parliamentary support for the opposition helped prevent Likud from forming a government and made alternative coalitions possible.
In some cases, Arab lawmakers then supported the government from outside, while politicians from the traditional right-wing camp eventually crossed political lines to join the governing arrangement.
Against that historical background, the 2026 result should be understood as an extraordinary opportunity for Israel’s liberal and anti-Netanyahu forces. The central question is whether their leaders will recognize it or miss the opportunity.
Netanyahu remains the prime minister under whose watch the catastrophe of Oct. 7 occurred. His government has resisted the establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding the attack. His coalition has advanced measures widely criticized as threats to democratic institutions, while presiding over an increasingly polarized society.
Another term for Netanyahu and his present allies could deepen Israel’s institutional deterioration, social divisions and strategic vulnerability. For critics who believe the country is already approaching a dangerous democratic and societal crossroads, the stakes are difficult to overstate.
There is also a striking inconsistency in the argument that relying on Arab support is somehow beyond the bounds of legitimate politics.
Netanyahu himself explored the possibility of forming a government with the support of Mansour Abbas, the leader of Ra’am, in 2021. That possibility collapsed largely because Bezalel Smotrich, now one of Netanyahu’s most prominent far-right partners, refused to accept it.
The time has come for Israel to show some appreciation for its Arab citizens, who constitute roughly one-fifth of Israel’s population. They work, study, pay taxes and participate in the country’s civic and economic life. They vote in national elections and elect representatives to the Knesset. There is no coherent democratic justification for treating those representatives’ mandates as inherently less legitimate than those of Jewish lawmakers.
To be sure, Arab political parties hold positions, particularly on the Palestinian question, that many Jewish Israelis find deeply objectionable. Some of those disagreements are profound, and coalition negotiations involving Arab parties inevitably raise difficult questions about national identity, security and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
But ultra-Orthodox parties also hold positions that many secular Israelis regard as fundamentally incompatible with their vision of the country, including on religious authority, military service and civil liberties. Far-right parties in Netanyahu’s coalition have promoted policies that critics see as far more damaging to democratic norms than what governing with Arabs might achieve.
Israel’s declaration of independence promised equality. Israel’s opposition has a golden opportunity to keep that promise.
This story was originally published in the Forward. Click here to get the Forward’s free email newsletters delivered to your inbox.
Dan Perry is the former chief editor of The Associated Press in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books about Israel.